This document explains which versions of Boot.gs receive security fixes and how to report a vulnerability. We appreciate the work of security researchers who help keep the framework and its users safe.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
1.10.x |
✅ |
< 1.10 |
❌ |
The latest minor release receives all fixes. After a new minor release, the previous minor still receives security fixes for 3 months (see SUPPORT.md). Please upgrade to the latest release to stay protected.
Please do not report security vulnerabilities through public issues, discussions or pull requests.
- Preferred: use GitHub private vulnerability reporting — open the repository's Security tab → Report a vulnerability.
- Alternative: email security@maksymstoianov.com.
Please include:
- a short description and the type of issue (for example injection, prototype pollution, information disclosure);
- the affected versions;
- steps to reproduce or a proof of concept;
- the impact as you understand it, and any suggested fix.
| Step | Target |
|---|---|
| Acknowledgement of the report | within 5 business days |
| Initial assessment (validity and severity) | within 14 days |
| Fix released for critical or high severity | within 30 days of assessment |
| Fix for medium or low severity | in a regular release |
We keep you informed of progress and may ask for more details. Severity is rated with CVSS v3.1.
- We follow coordinated vulnerability disclosure: please keep the details private until a fix is released or 90 days have passed since your report, whichever comes first, unless we agree on another date together.
- Fixes are published as a new release, and confirmed vulnerabilities get a GitHub Security Advisory and, where applicable, a CVE.
- If a report is out of scope or not a vulnerability, we tell you why.
With your permission, we credit reporters by name or handle in the security advisory and release notes. Tell us in your report how you would like to be credited, or if you prefer to stay anonymous. We do not run a paid bug bounty programme.
In scope: the source code in this repository and the bootgs package published on npm.
Out of scope: vulnerabilities in Google Apps Script itself or other Google services (report them to Google), in third-party dependencies (report them upstream; we will update the dependency), and in applications built with Boot.gs that are caused by their own code or configuration.
npm package. Versions from 1.10.0 on are published from GitHub Actions with npm provenance. After installing, check the registry signatures and provenance attestations of your dependency tree:
npm audit signaturesThe provenance shown on npmjs.com/package/bootgs names the repository
bootgs/boot, the workflow .github/workflows/release-please.yml and the commit the version was built from.
GitHub release assets. Releases after 1.10.1 (the workflow change in pull request #171) carry the npm tarball
bootgs-<version>.tgz, its Sigstore build provenance bootgs-<version>.tgz.sigstore.json and the CycloneDX SBOM
bootgs-<version>.cdx.json. 1.10.1 has only an SBOM (sbom.cdx.json); earlier releases have no assets. Verify a
downloaded tarball with the GitHub CLI:
gh attestation verify bootgs-<version>.tgz --repo bootgs/boot \
--signer-workflow bootgs/boot/.github/workflows/release-please.ymlThe attestation is valid only if it was signed by the release-please.yml workflow of bootgs/boot, which runs on
pushes to main (or a manual run for an existing tag).
- No long-lived publishing credential exists: npm publishing uses
trusted publishing (OIDC) from the
npmenvironment. - Workflows use only the per-run
GITHUB_TOKEN, with permissions declared per job (release-please.ymlpassessecrets.GITHUB_TOKENto release-please; no other secret is referenced). - If a secret becomes necessary, it is stored only as a GitHub Actions secret scoped to an environment, is accessible to maintainers only, and is rotated at least once a year and immediately on suspected exposure.
- GitHub secret scanning and push protection are enabled for the repository.
- Who has access to these resources: MAINTAINERS.md.
Software composition analysis (SCA).
ci.yml runs on every pull request and on pushes to main and develop:
npm audit --omit=dev --audit-level=high— a high or critical vulnerability in a runtime dependency fails the check and blocks merging;- the
licencesstep — a runtime dependency outside the allow-list (Apache-2.0,MIT,BSD-2-Clause,BSD-3-Clause,ISC,0BSD) fails the check and always blocks merging.
Moderate and low findings are fixed within 30 days or before the next release, whichever comes first, usually through Dependabot updates. No release is made while an SCA violation is open.
Static analysis (SAST). CodeQL analyses JavaScript/TypeScript and GitHub Actions
on every pull request and push to main and develop and weekly; ESLint with eslint-plugin-security runs in CI.
High and critical CodeQL alerts are fixed before merging, medium ones before the next release. A finding may be
dismissed only as a false positive or not exploitable, with the reason written in the alert.
These thresholds are project policy, applied through the required CI checks and maintainer review of every pull request.
- Keep dependencies updated: use the latest
bootgsrelease and keep other packages current. - Secret management: never commit API keys or secrets; use
PropertiesServiceor another secret store. - Least privilege: request only the OAuth scopes you need in
appsscript.json. - Input validation: validate and sanitise all request input, for example with the built-in validation pipes.
Thank you for helping us keep Boot.gs secure!